Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts by Carrington, Paul D.
Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for
Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts
Paul D. Carrington
Editor's note: A version of this paper was presented at a conference held at the
University ofAlabama School of Law. The earlier paper was published as Renovating
Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REv. 51 (1997).
Readers will note that, for some time, there have been movements to reform the
discovery provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sometimes unclear have
been the purposes of reform, and indeed of discovery itself.
Indeed, why do American courts, virtually alone in the world, empower lawyers
to investigate disputed facts? The reality is that discovery is more deeply rooted in our
legal and political culture than many who bear its costs notice, or care to acknowledge.
I. THE ADVENT OF DISCOVERY AND PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
While much of the practice and diction of discovery was known to the English
Court of Chancery, discovery was not a major feature of American law until the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938. The 1934 Rules Enabling Act' had
been a political triumph of the American Bar Association.2 Its primary goal was the
unification of the federal judiciary in serving the common purpose of enforcing rights and
duties of citizens challenged or endangered in civil litigation. On that account, it enjoyed
the support, indeed the zealous advocacy, of nationalists as diverse in their politics as the
arch conservative William Howard Taft and Charles Edward Clark, a committed New
Dealer.
Anyone writing procedure rules on a clean slate in 1936 would have done as Judge
Clark and his drafting committee chose to do in rejecting the traditional practice of code
pleading, then prevalent in most states. In adapting discovery for general use,3 the
draftsmen acted on a premise supplied to us in
the Eighteenth Century by the Enlightenment.
The premise is that cases ought be decided on Paul D. Carrington, Professor, Duke
the facts and the law, and not as a University School of Law.
consequence of the skill or luck of the
parties' representatives in games such as
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jousting or Sumo, a sport initially devised as a method of dispute resolution,4 or a word
game such as common law, or later code, pleading. That idea of the Enlightenment has
been notably celebrated by Max Weber.5 Few if any advocates of discovery reform would
question that premise.
The discovery rules elevated the law-enforcing role of the federal courts.6 Not
only were federal courts committed to enforcing law in civil cases, but they were assured
of being more able to investigate and discern facts in dispute than any courts had ever
been. The private bar, serving as officers of the courts, were effectively commissioned
to use the courts' subpoena power to investigate a wide range of possibly unlawful
conduct.7
While some critics doubted that the increased accuracy in the application of the
law was worth the cost to the litigants of the new methods of investigation,' by the mid-
1960s, the federal courts had replaced administrative agencies as the preferred means of
enforcing much of our national law. Unlike administrative agencies and other political
bodies in any government anywhere, the federal courts, their juries, and the private bar
serving them were almost invulnerable to political manipulation, intimidation or bribery
in any of their many forms.9 The federal district court was therefore as close to a level
playing field as any public forum had ever been.'" Armed with the contempt power," the
federal courts were indeed a daunting threat to anyone considering a possible violation of
the national law potentially injurious to the rights of others. 2 Law enforcement in civil
cases, not mere dispute resolution, became the primary business of the federal courts. 3
Primarily enforced through civil litigation were federal laws deterring trade practices
injurious to markets in goods and fraud injurious to investment markets, laws protecting
civil rights and civil liberties, and laws protecting the environment. Where other
countries relied upon administrative bureaucracies to protect the public interest in these
large and important areas, America relied primarily upon its courts because they proved
to be more effective.
State courts and legislatures in most states soon perceived this effect and
replicated the federal practice in their state courts."' We have by means of Rules 26-3 7
and their analogues in state law, privatized a great deal of our law enforcement, especially
in such fields as antitrust and trade regulation, consumer protection, securities regulation,
civil rights, and intellectual property. More frequently than before, American lawyers
were giving their clients the unwelcome advice that unlawful conduct harmful to others
would likely be detected and the law enforced. In short, American law became
surprisingly effective. Private litigants in America thus do, and do more effectively, much
of what is in other industrial states done by public officers working within an
administrative bureaucracy." This development coincided with the steady rise in the
rights-consciousness of the American people.
This development was entirely consistent with American political traditions. At
least since the time of Andrew Jackson, 6 many and sometimes most Americans had been
skeptical about the ability of bureaucratic government to protect the individual interests
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of ordinary citizens from predations by those with greater wealth and economic power.
That skepticism was repressed during the Progressive Era and by the New Deal, when
most of our federal bureaucracies were created. But it was confirmed a thousand times
in the first half of this century that regulatory agencies tend to be co-opted by those whom
they regulate. 7
As a result, we have since about 1950 acted on the belief that if individuals of
modest standing and resources are to be secure from predation by those possessing the
means of exploitation, private civil litigation is the best means available to them.
Congress and state legislatures have therefore been disinclined to create new regulatory
bureaucracies and have generally expressed regulatory purposes by imposing civil liability
on predatory conduct they mean to deter. Legislators and their constituents have known
that, however numerous their many deficiencies, are more likely than bureaucracies to
enforce the rights of individuals without fear or favor. 8 Discovery has been an essential
instrument in that shift from bureaucratic to private regulation.
Unsurprisingly, those receiving the unwelcome advice that their misdeeds are
detectable by private counsel find discovery and the uniquely American form of private
law enforcement to be objectionable. Many American firms perceive themselves to be
victims of discovery. And the knowledge that discovery can result in exposure of
corporate misdeeds is a major reason why foreign firms doing business in the United
States tend to despise American courts, and why they strenuously resist the introduction
of that practice in their home countries.
Not so many years ago, our economy seemed to be in disarray. Vice-President
Quayle was put in charge of a commission to restore the competitiveness of American
business. Among the concerns his group expressed was the high legal costs inflicted on
our entrepreneurs. The longstanding grievance of the chamber of commerce and similar
organizations against discovery was again voiced. Not observed by the Quayle
Commission was the fact that the higher legal costs paid by American firms are balanced
by higher taxes paid in Europe and Japan by firms in those countries that are more heavily
regulated by administrative offices and agencies. Senator Biden seemingly sought to steal
a march on the Vice President and sought the help of the Brookings Institute to prepare
a quick study leading to enactment of the ill-considered Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.
The principal effect of that legislation was to encourage local experimentation by federal
district courts in their management of pretrial litigation. The discovery rules were
modified in 1993 to accommodate the experiments being conducted pursuant to that act.
The period prescribed for such experiments having come to an end, it is again time for
those responsible for the federal civil rules to revise them to reflect current understanding
and practice. It seems almost certain that revisions will be made next year, and proposals
to effect change are presently percolating through the elaborate system by which rule
changes are accomplished.
As the Quayle Commission report tends to demonstrate, there is a chronic
tendency of business firms who are inviting targets for litigation to conflate procedural
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reform with tort reform. Those who cannot hope to secure relief by the legislative
abrogation of the rights of the citizens who are suing them may seek to achieve that result
by the more devious means of impeding their adversaries' access to the evidence needed
to establish their claims. Nevertheless, there may be merit in some proposals for
substantive law reform intersecting with discovery. For example, there is at least some
merit in eliminating the occasion for expensive document searches in products liability
cases. 9 It is in the public interest that corporate officers have discussions of risks
unfettered by the threat of liability imposed on the basis of intramural discussions. Tort
liability, I do not doubt, is a useful incentive to manufacturers to make prudent decisions
about the risks to users of their products. But it may be counterproductive to that purpose
to impose or increase liability on the basis of communications between officers of
manufacturing firms discussing such risks candidly. Neither liability nor damages ought
be framed in such a way that candid internal discussion has substantial adverse
consequences for the firm. For that reason, the law of products liability should perhaps
be reformed to make the manufacturer's subjective state of mind irrelevant. Such a
reform would materially reduce the cost of discovery in products liability cases, for there
would be no point in searches through storehouses of documents looking for the
proverbial smoking gun that is nothing more than an expression of concern about apparent
hazards.
It is, however, contrary to the public interest to allow manufacturers' legitimate
concern for the consequences of socially counterproductive document searches to drive
a substantial reform of discovery practice having broader ramifications for the
enforceability of the rights of citizens. We ought keep clearly in mind that discovery is
the American alternative to the administrative state. Unless corresponding new powers
are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would diminish the disincentives
for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.
II. THE CASE AGAINST LOCALISM
The most heated issue regarding the present proposals to reform federal discovery
practice is one of no more than modest interest to state judges, but requires brief note
here. As a result of Senator Biden's Civil Justice Reform Act,20 and local plans
promulgated pursuant to that legislation, there remain detritus of local rules or standing
orders bearing on the subject of discovery. While the official study of the local rules by
the Civil Justice Institute was not designed to measure the effects of local differences in
discovery rules, its data tends to confirm a high level of dissatisfaction with localism in
discovery rules.2" A loose survey conducted by the ABA Section on Litigation speaks
strongly to this same issue."
The data accord with common sense. The costs of localism in discovery practice
are apparent. Local discovery plans and rules, including standing orders or, as they are
sometimes called, local-local rules, create clutter impeding the efforts of lawyers, and
sometimes even judges, to know what their rights, powers, and duties might be.23 They
V 459
HeinOnline  -- 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 459 1999-2000
Carrington
add complexity, and thereby add to the investment of lawyer time required to move cases.
They are especially a burden to lawyers and litigants who appear episodically in court, or
in more than one district court, and they confer an inappropriate benefit on local repeat
players. In some cases, it may be necessary for litigants to retain local counsel merely to
secure guidance through the maze of local discovery rules.
There are, on the other hand, few if any redeeming benefits of localism in
procedure rules. There are no differences among federal districts, or among counties
within a state system, to warrant differences in discovery practice to reflect local
conditions. Whatever differences may exist in the professional cultures of different
districts, there are none that bear any rational connection to the present law of discovery.
This was the position of the Congress of the United States in 1988 when it
enacted legislation to constrain the local rulemaking power.24 The Judicial Conference
in response to Congressional concern established the Local Rules Project2" resulting in the
reconsideration and elimination of many local rules and in the promulgation of revised
Rule 83 in 1995.26 Among the local rules that were not consistent with the national rules
were scores bearing on discovery. After enactment of the 1988 revision of the Rules
Enabling Act, all such rules were forbidden by Congress, and it was a task for the Civil
Rules Committee to help make that clear to district judges. The most common kind of
local rule invalidated by the 1988 law were standard restrictions on the number of
interrogatories a party could serve except by leave of court.27 Almost every district had
such a rule, and after 1988, all of them were invalid.
The 1990 Act was a puzzling but momentary reversal of direction by Congress.
While directing the district courts to establish local plans, it did not explicitly or by
necessary implication repeal the 1988 proscription on deviant local rules, and hence did
not authorize a local plan to violate a national rule.28 There was never any thought by
those who write procedure rules that localism was desirable for its own sake. Indeed, the
Civil Rules Committee continued to strive in the direction of national uniformity. This
was evidenced by the revision of Rule 83 to make it conform to the Rules Enabling Act
as modified in 1988. Now, however, come many federal judges who, having imbibed the
intoxicating drink of local rulemaking, wish not to give it up.
I do not perceive that local rulemaking is a serious problem in state courts. But
the present imbroglio in the rulemaking process of the Judicial Conference of the United
States suggests the wisdom of a state policy never, never to commission local groups of
judges to make their own rules.
III. DISCLOSURE
Much of the brouhaha in federal rulemaking has to do with the provision of Rule
26(a)(1) requiring parties and their attorneys to disclose at the outset evidence in their
possession bearing on the issues raised by the pleadings. That provision was introduced
into the rules in 1993 as a device for enabling lawyers to plan and to manage discovery.
The 1993 provision contained a local option provision and was promulgated chiefly
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because several local districts wanted to experiment with such a requirement that would
have been in violation of the rules, absent the 1993 provision. The evidence on the utility
of the disclosure requirement suggests that the reform was mildly useful where tried, but
had no major consequence. The rulemakers are inclined to make a modified disclosure
provision a part of the national rules. Some lawyers and judges are strongly opposed.
Lawyer opposition is generally rooted in their attachment to the adversary
tradition. It is the fear of some that their clients will feel betrayed if they turn over to
adversaries evidence harmful to their clients' causes. That objection is one that has been
advanced to prior reforms designed to pursue the Enlightenment aim of applying law to
facts. Those clients who would be exposed to just liability tend to be the first to insist on
the adversary tradition that allows counsel to impede the presentation of just claims or
defenses by opponents.
One answer to that concern was expressed in 1814 by Justice Brackenridge of the
Supreme Court, in pronouncing, "I disclaim as lawyers those who avail themselves of the
slips of counsel; and would take advantage of a mistake. These may be said to carry on
the legal war, not according to the laws of civilized practice, but resembling savages, who
make their attacks waxen, which is a species of assassination."29 More recently, another
Pennsylvania lawyer, Henry Drinker, explained,
Five hundred years ago the law was a game, the processes of which were
continually and openly employed by means of obscure technicalities, serving no
useful purpose. . . . Recently, with increasing insistence, the bar and the courts have
taken radical steps.., to simplify and develop promptly and dispose of, finally and
clearly, the real issues in the case. ... It is clearly the duty of the bar to cooperate
wholeheartedly in developing all such new procedures and in making them work
practically.3
The duty of the lawyer is to be an adversary within such rules as may be
prescribed; it is not a proper purpose of procedural rules to pit adversaries against one
another or to reward the party with the most effective advocate.
Some states are ahead of the federal courts in the use of disclosure requirements.
I have no data on their experience. Unless further study reveals costs or benefits that are
so far unrevealed, a state ought to consider adopting the disclosure requirement of Rule
26(a)(1), but without expectation that its use will bring any substantial change in the cost
or delay experienced by litigants.
IV. JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
Anxiety about the requirement that parties disclose evidence before it is requested
by an adversary raises a separate issue regarding the proper role of court and counsel in
preparing cases for trial. In recent decades, federal judges have with increasing frequency
practiced case management. The practice is not unknown to state courts. It requires that
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cases be assigned to individual judges promptly at filing so that each judge can manage
his or her cases. The aim is to prevent the metastasization of disputes, perhaps especially
disputes over discovery matters.
As Judith Resnik points out, judicial case management is a misnomer; it is more
accurately denoted as judicial management of lawyers. 3 Few would contend for a return
to the adversary tradition as it was known prior to the advent of discovery. 32 It was
implicit in the 193 8 rules that the role of the advocate was modified to impose a limited
duty of cooperation in the investigation of facts in dispute.33 Such a duty was not novel,
but had been long known to equity practice. 34 Nevertheless, the breadth of the discovery
rules substantially enlarged the duty of counsel as an officer of the court to cooperate.
Of course, there have always been clients who preferred lawyers who neglected
public duty to protect their private interest, and the lawyers for such clients have powerful
incentives to neglect their duties. That is especially likely to be so for lawyers
representing parties asserting groundless claims or defenses. By enlarging their
professional duty, the 1938 Rules enlarged the pressures on such counsel to misuse the
process. There seemed to have been as a result a gradual erosion of the conduct of
lawyers engaged in discovery practice that became noticeable in the 1960s. 31 Judicial case
management has been the judges' response to the diverse tactical ploys employed by
lawyers to gain illicit advantage. 36 Among the illicit means sometimes employed were
the imposition of costs on adversaries by excessive and pointless discovery, stonewalling,
and burying adversaries in a blizzard of useless disclosures." Such tactics can be
controlled and even eliminated by prudent case management of big and bitterly contested
cases in which they are most likely to appear.
Judicial case management is, however, in its more extreme forms a costly, radical
transformation of the American legal tradition.38 It is sometimes explained as a mere
adaption of the judicial practices commonly found on the continent of Europe or in
Japan. 39 And so, in important respects, it is. But the suitability of civil law practice in the
United States is dubious. Courts in civil law countries are not generally used for the wide
range of political and regulatory purposes that American courts are employed. Judges in
those countries are selected at a very early stage in their professional careers and therefore
have no political roots40 and no connections to "interest groups." And there is no right to
jury trial in civil cases underscoring the importance of individual access to a disinterested
finding of fact by lay persons. For these reasons, the civil law example is one to be
followed only with the greatest caution.
The Civil Justice Reform Act was not cautious in promoting more aggressive case
management;4' its authors appeared to suppose thatjudicial management might be the key
to the presumed, if non-demonstrable, problem of cost and delay. The votes are now in
and it is clear that judicial management is not a magic bullet to achieve the stated aims of
the Act. The data generated indicates that judicial management has been oversold, that
heavy management in the minerun of cases is a waste of time or worse.42 The
misdirection of a districtjudge's time and energy is a waste with extended consequences.
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Because judges are a scarce resource, their misuse results in losses felt elsewhere. The
one most important and indispensable duty of trial judges is to try cases, thus to enforce
the law and to concentrate the minds of parties on the settlement of their disputes "in the
shadow of the law."'43 If judicial case management reduces the availability of judges to
conduct trials, that is an important loss.
There are other adverse effects of case management that are ineffable. A
secondary and unwelcome effect is a modification of the courts' focus away from the task
of law enforcement. The primary concern of judges who manage cases is to achieve
dispositions, i.e., to move cases through the court to whatever disposition the parties can
be induced to accept. This is a different mission from that of courts trying cases, whose
primary task is to achieve correct results, i.e., results conforming to the law.
Another unwelcome secondary effect of judicial management is to increase the
moral responsibility of the individual trial judge. Whereas the institution of discovery
expanded the temptations of counsel, case management expands the temptations of the
judge because it increases the range of discretion exercised. When combined with the
diminishing intensity of appellate review in the federal system," it has helped to make
federal district judges more like chancellors sitting on the woolsack of autocratic power,
and less like officers of the law accountable for their exercise of official power.45 The
hidden effect of case management is a transfer of power away from individual parties and
their lawyers, and also from juries or appellate courts who would review decisions on the
merits when and if rendered.
However, these unwelcome consequences of judicial case management do not
suggest the wisdom of a return to the days when counsel were free to abuse or impede
discovery. Rather, they suggest that case management techniques should not be employed
routinely in the absence of evidence that there are abuses to be prevented that cannot be
controlled by other means and thus that real benefits can be secured. Judicial involvement
in pretrial litigation should be the exception, not the rule.
Given appropriate incentives, lawyers can manage pretrial litigation in most cases
with minimal involvement ofjudges. As the ICJ (Institute for Civil Justice) data suggest,
the first and most essential incentive to be provided by the court is a reasonably firm trial
date.46 Such a date should with rare exception be set by conference call within hours after
an issue is joined. While it is generally desirable that the date be sooner rather than later,
there is no need or justification for haste so urgent that it deprives the parties of a full
opportunity for discovery. Nor is there justification for refusing modest postponements
necessitated by a surprise in discovery. But with those qualifications, it can be said that
the single most important deed a district judge can perform in the administration of
pretrial litigation is to set a trial date and stick as closely to that date as possible.
With a credible trial date, the lawyers can in most cases plan discovery without
the participation of a judge. The ICJ study confirms that this is so. The discovery
conference prescribed for the federal practice by Rule 26() 47 generally works when
employed for its intended purpose.48 Especially does it work if counsel comply with the
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disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 26(a)(1).49 Those disclosures, however much
as they may be despised by lawyers who perceive them as undermining their relations
with clients,0 establish a framework for planning discovery without undue delay. If such
disclosures are not made, planning by lawyers is impeded and the obvious alternative is
for the court to step in and manage the case or (as Resnik has it) the lawyers, a step that
is in the end more a derogation of the role of counsel and parties than is compliance with
modest disclosure requirements. The ICJ data suggest that a state revising its practice
rules in light of recent federal experience should retain the substance of both 26(f) and
(a)(1), making them the source of the discovery plan fit to the case that will control the
conduct of pretrial litigation in all but the rare case.
As a concession to the concerns of lawyers who despise the idea of voluntary
disclosure, a state's rules committee ought consider re-writing those provisions. One
change might be to make explicit the duty of parties and counsel to cooperate in
discovery. Lawyers know of their duty, but parties often do not, and lawyers should be
given all available help in explaining to their clients why disclosures must be made to
adversaries without requiring rulings by the court at each point of revelation.
Another revision might be to change the diction of the disclosure requirements,
perhaps to state them in the form of questions, as "standard interrogatories" to be
answered as a predicate to the formulation of a discovery plan wrought by counsel.5
In addition, as an aid to parties and counsel in planning, a state's rules might
provide some presumptive parameters to be extended by agreement whenever good cause
is shown. The most important parameter is a time within which discovery will be
completed. The ICJ data suggest that 120 days is generally a suitable presumptive norm.52
Other parameters that might be useful include a presumptive limit on the number of
interrogatories, and on the number and length of depositions. These are included in the
proposed Federal Rules.
To make it clear that discovery planning is a duty of counsel, it might also be
prudent to relieve the court of the authority to intercede and manage a case that the parties
are managing to their own satisfaction without intervention of the court, save perhaps in
exceptional circumstances to be stated by the court. At the same time, the court must
make it clear that the duty of parties to cooperate in planning discovery is a duty that the
court will enforce and enforce so promptly that no counsel or party will be tempted to
delay proceedings by making matters unnecessarily difficult for an adversary. To that
end, practice rules might wisely provide that motions respecting discovery shall unless
otherwise specifically ordered be made orally and ruled upon "forthwith." Judges who
effectively and promptly enforce rights with respect to discovery are much less likely to
be burdened with frequent interruptions of their work by frivolous discovery disputes than
those who take such motions under advisement and await opportunities to read briefs and
transcripts of depositions. Because delays in ruling create incentives for counsel to bicker
over trifling discovery issues, judges who do not rule quickly make more work for
themselves while imposing costs on the parties.
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It might also be useful for the rules to explicitly authorize counsel to record
discovery conferences as well as depositions. A recording would better enable a party to
demonstrate a lack of cooperation by an adversary, and thus enhance the threat of
sanctions against a party who does not cooperate in planning discovery.
Practice under the 1938 Rules was characterized by an absence of the application
of sanctions under Rules 37.53 Weak enforcement by courts contributed to the problem
of abuse and delay by counsel. 4 While the sanctions provisions were strengthened by the
addition of Rule 26(g)," it remains true that federal judges have been reluctant to punish
lawyers for playing hostile games with discovery. A likely reason for this weakness is
that judges were lawyers once and identify with pressures felt by lawyers to aggressively
protect interests of clients even at the expense of performance of duties to the court.
Another reason is that an application of sanctions creates satellite litigation on the
appropriateness and measure of the sanction. The unhappy federal experience with
sanctions under Rule 1156 has likely reinforced the disinclination of many judges to
impose sanctions on the abuse of discovery.
A state considering these issues should therefore give serious attention to other
possible incentives to cooperate. In particular, consideration should be given to the
application of the English rule" on shifting attorneys' fees incurred in the resolution of
discovery disputes. This would mean that whenever a court ruled on a discovery issue,
the prevailing party would be entitled automatically to reasonable attorneys' fees to
compensate for the cost of litigating the issue. The demerit of this English rule in its
application to final judgments is that it unduly chills the assertion of claims and defenses.
But that is just the result desired with respect to discovery disputes. It would provide
counsel with an additional reason to give her or his client for not contesting a discovery
issue that there would be an additional cost associated with an unsuccessful contention.
If the English rule were adopted for this limited purpose, a civil rules committee ought
consider the use of an English-style taxing master"8 to relieve the court of the burden and
authority to fix the fee.
Moreover, in that rare case in which irrationally contentious parties are frequently
resorting to the court over discovery issues, the court should be encouraged to appoint a
special master to manage the case. 9 The merit of the special mastership is that it imposes
the cost of childish bickering on sometimes infantile counsel and their clients rather than
on the public, and leaves the judge accessible to those who need decisions on the merits
or who need prompt attention to legitimate discovery disputes. Experience in California
suggests, however, the importance of regulating the fees of attorneys appointed as special
masters.6 o
V. THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
Twenty years ago, the advisory committee on the federal rules proposed to narrow
the scope of discovery by requiring that it be directed to matters "relevant to the claim or
defense of a party. ' ' 6' This was thought to be narrower than the present language requiring
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that discovery be relevant to the subject matter of the action. After hearing comments on
this proposal, the committee withdrew it, reaffirming its doubts whether such a change
would do more than replace one very general term with another.62 The proposal had
originated in the American College of Trial Lawyers, who desultorily renewed the
suggestion from time to time. During my eight years as reporter to the committee, the
idea was briefly considered, and rejected for the same reason that it had been rejected
before.
Now, in 1999, the proposal has found new life. With slight changes, it is now
proposed to revise Rule 26(b)(1) in essentially the same form so often rejected in the past.
The proposal is resisted by thoughtful and disinterested groups such as the Federal Courts
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It is supported chiefly
if not exclusively by litigants who are "habitual defendants." The argument for the
change is that it will "send a message" to judges to be more aggressive in restraining
excessive discovery. The arguments against it are more numerous. They are that the new
rule is vague, will encourage satellite litigation, and will shelter unwarranted resistance
to discovery. "Sending a message" by vague language is not an effective means of
achieving the aim. Moreover, the revised rule is inconsistent with notice pleading and a
throwback to the code pleading practices found to be so unsatisfactory sixty years ago.
The response will be prolix pleading that will be even less helpful to lawyers trying to
manage discovery efficiently.
Recognizing the desire of the defense bar to promote this idea, I suggested a
compromise that would append the desired language to Rule 34 bearing on document
discovery. Because the problem of excessive discovery, to the extent that it exists, is
chiefly a problem with documents,63 it seemed prudent to limit the questionable change
to that rule. For perspective, it may be useful to recall that the original 1938 version of
Rule 34 did provide for narrower discovery with respect to documents. 64 The fact that this
suggestion has gained no consideration confirms to me that the aim of the proponents of
the rule is indeed to sanction resistance to legitimate discovery. I would hope that if the
change is indeed adopted that no state would follow suit with a similar change to their
practice rules.
VI. OTHER SUGGESTED REFORMS
There are other changes to the discovery rules worthy of consideration by state
rulemakers. First, it would be wise to require exchange of signed or adopted statements,
or perhaps statements of possible witnesses in any form that could be presented as
evidence. The existing federal rule protects such statements as trial preparation material,6"
but requires that copies of such statements be supplied to the witnesses who adopted
them, 66 from whom, of course, they are discoverable under Rule 45.67 While an adopted
statement is technically trial preparation material, it is much more than the mental
impressions and thinking of counsel -- it is potentially a prior inconsistent statement, and
the thinking it reflects is primarily that of the party or witness, not the lawyer.6' The
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protected retention of such statements in the present Rule undermines the aims of the
process in other ways. It enables counsel to impose unnecessary costs on adversaries and
to engage in sharp practice by misleading hints of the content of the statements. The
present practice therefore gives too little service to the values of the work product
protection and too much harm to the duty of cooperation to merit its continuation.
States might also consider creating a presumptive limit on the number of
depositions, and restricting depositions in three other respects. The federal experience
suggests that it should be explicit that all objections to questions asked at a deposition are
automatically reserved if not immediately presented to and ruled upon by thejudge, unless
examining counsel otherwise directs.69 The purpose of this practice is to save the time of
lawyers and deponents presently devoted to bickering over the form of questions. Absent
such a non-waiver provision, the time limits on depositions will be made inappropriate
in a particular instance by prolonged bickering. Counsel for the deponent should, of
course, be expected to assert applicable evidentiary privileges,7" but should otherwise
remain silent during the examination by other parties, unless the examining counsel
wishes assurance that a particular question and answer are in a form allowing them to be
used at trial.
Second, states might prudently provide that a deposition can be reopened at the
request of any party, provided however that unless the deponent. agrees, or the court for
good cause so orders, a secondary examination shall be conducted by teleconference or
telephone, and further provided that such a discontinuous deposition shall not exceed the
time allowed by the schedule, except for good cause. One effect of this change is to
diminish the need to modify the discovery plan every time there is a surprise at a
deposition. A second purpose is to allow for more efficient depositions and more efficient
preparation by counsel, who could under such a revised rule prepare for a deposition with
reduced concern for surprise testimony or revelation of documents not previously seen.
If a surprise occurs during a deposition, a surprised party can discontinue the deposition
and return to it at a later time, after further investigation and preparation has been
pursued.
Third, experience suggests the wisdom of a rule allowing any deposition recorded
on videotape or other comparable technologies to be used at trial, even though the
deponent is within reach of a subpoena. The present federal rule requiring the use of live
testimony7' was written on the assumption that the deposition would have to be read into
the record at trial by some person other than the deponent. That is no longer the case;
indeed it would be appropriate to require the exhibition of videotape when available in
order to preserve demeanor evidence that is lost when a substitute witness reads a
deposition into the record. Moreover, it will save costs if litigants can be educated to
expect that videotaped depositions will be the usual form in which testimony is taken and
in which it is presented at trial. Videotaped depositions can be edited to eliminate useless
banter as well as inadmissible evidence. And evidentiary rulings regarding testimony can
be made in limine.72
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A suggestion pertaining to document discovery is to afford a producing party the
option of making a production of documents confidential for the scrutiny only of
adversary counsel. A party making a confidential production would waive no evidentiary
privileges with respect to documents so produced.73 No document so produced would be
filed with the court or otherwise used or publicized by counsel receiving the documents
in confidence without the express approval of the producing party. The purpose of such
a provision would be to enable the disclosing party to produce vast quantities of material
without the expense of thorough pre-screening of every document produced. Much
expense is incurred in present practice as a result of producing counsel's fear that a
privilege may be waived by improvident disclosure of a privileged document. Such a
mistake would be very injurious to the reputation of counsel and could expose a law firm
to enormous liabilities.74 The purpose of my suggestion would be to relax those fears.
Of course, prudent counsel would, despite such a rule, not disclose in confidence
material that was known to be sensitive. All care would not be abandoned. But there are
situations in which very substantial savings might be effected. This would be so where,
for example, a haystack is not known to contain any needles, and is unlikely to contain
even a simple straight pin. A party might then reasonably calculate that the saving in the
cost of prescreening is worth a slight risk that (a) prejudicial but privileged evidence will
be discovered, and (b) adversary counsel will in violation of the rule refuse to return the
privileged item and refrain from using it. In some commercial litigation, the savings
resulting from such confidential disclosure could run to seven or even eight figures. A
risk in this proposal is that it might facilitate the tactic of burying a requesting party in an
avalanche of documents.
Another outstanding issue of discovery meriting discussion by state rulemakers
is the controversy regarding the practice of suppressing discovery material as part of a
settlement, especially in mass tort litigation."' It is argued in favor of the practice that
parties should not be permitted a free ride on expensive discovery conducted in earlier
like cases involving the same adversary. To preserve such material for use in subsequent
similar cases deprives the party against whom it is used of the settlement bargaining chip
represented by the cost of discovery. The diseconomies of redundant discovery ought be
avoided if possible. The bargaining chip in question is not one the law ought be at pains
to protect because it has no relationship to the merits of claims and defenses. It reflects,
instead, the unavoidable but regrettable deficiencies of the legal process. For this reason,
I suggest that the discovery rules should generally obligate parties to produce discovery
materials produced in other like cases even if those cases were resolved short of trial. I
have particularly in mind transcripts of depositions and responses to interrogatories, data
compilations, tangible things, and other like items that are not privileged and not subject
to a work product protection.
In the short term, this last reform would eliminate one of the incentives to
settlement of some cases, especially those that might be described as "test" cases. On the
other hand, it would seem to reduce materially the cost of litigating later cases of the same
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type. It would therefore increase the settlement value of meritorious claims and defenses.
VII. Conclusion
Taken together, the changes suggested here would substantially reduce the
involvement ofjudges in the conduct of pretrial litigation. While it is unlikely that these
changes would materially reduce the evils of cost and delay, they might effect marginal
improvements, and it seems almost certain that they would not contribute to any increase
in cost or delay. It bears reiteration that the most important steps to be taken by judges
are to set a reasonably firm trial date, provide reasonable and tailored parameters to the
time for discovery, and rule promptly on discovery disputes. Beyond those steps the
judges should not go, except in the rare case too complex to be managed by counsel.
They should then concentrate their efforts on judging cases, not managing lawyers.
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